Detecting Genuine and Deliberate Displays of Surprise in Static and Dynamic Faces by Zloteanu, Mircea et al.
fpsyg-09-01184 July 7, 2018 Time: 16:52 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 10 July 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01184
Edited by:
Maurizio Codispoti,
Università degli Studi di Bologna, Italy
Reviewed by:
Lynden K. Miles,
University of Aberdeen,
United Kingdom
Steven Robert Livingstone,
University of Wisconsin–River Falls,
United States
*Correspondence:
Mircea Zloteanu
m.zloteanu@ucl.ac.uk
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Emotion Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 07 March 2018
Accepted: 19 June 2018
Published: 10 July 2018
Citation:
Zloteanu M, Krumhuber EG and
Richardson DC (2018) Detecting
Genuine and Deliberate Displays
of Surprise in Static and Dynamic
Faces. Front. Psychol. 9:1184.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01184
Detecting Genuine and Deliberate
Displays of Surprise in Static and
Dynamic Faces
Mircea Zloteanu1,2* , Eva G. Krumhuber2 and Daniel C. Richardson2
1 Department of Computer Science, University College London, London, United Kingdom, 2 Department of Experimental
Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
People are good at recognizing emotions from facial expressions, but less accurate
at determining the authenticity of such expressions. We investigated whether this
depends upon the technique that senders use to produce deliberate expressions, and
on decoders seeing these in a dynamic or static format. Senders were filmed as they
experienced genuine surprise in response to a jack-in-the-box (Genuine). Other senders
faked surprise with no preparation (Improvised) or after having first experienced genuine
surprise themselves (Rehearsed). Decoders rated the genuineness and intensity of these
expressions, and the confidence of their judgment. It was found that both expression
type and presentation format impacted decoder perception and accurate discrimination.
Genuine surprise achieved the highest ratings of genuineness, intensity, and judgmental
confidence (dynamic only), and was fairly accurately discriminated from deliberate
surprise expressions. In line with our predictions, Rehearsed expressions were perceived
as more genuine (in dynamic presentation), whereas Improvised were seen as more
intense (in static presentation). However, both were poorly discriminated as not being
genuine. In general, dynamic stimuli improved authenticity discrimination accuracy and
perceptual differences between expressions. While decoders could perceive subtle
differences between different expressions (especially from dynamic displays), they were
not adept at detecting if these were genuine or deliberate. We argue that senders are
capable of producing genuine-looking expressions of surprise, enough to fool others as
to their veracity.
Keywords: facial expressions, posed, emotions, genuineness, accuracy, intensity
INTRODUCTION
Facial expressions are an important source of emotional and social information in interpersonal
communication. Knowing what another person feels is relevant in predicting someone’s
psychological state, likely future behavior, and the outcome of social interactions (Johnston et al.,
2010). However, not all expressions are truthful reflections of a person’s underlying emotions.
While genuine emotional expressions may inform about the affective state of a person, deliberate
or voluntary expressions reflect the strategic intent of the sender in the absence of felt emotions
(Ekman and Rosenberg, 2005). For example, deliberate displays can be used to prevent conflict
or escalation, spare feelings, reassure, and gain someone’s trust (Ekman and Friesen, 1982).
Alternatively, they may be employed to manipulate, deceive, and mask underlying affect or
intentions (Ekman and Friesen, 1982). Thus, the ability to discern if someone’s emotional display
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is genuine or deliberate is of high value in social interaction. The
present research explores how different strategies for producing
deliberate expressions impact decoders’ perception and ability to
detect their authenticity.
Research on emotion recognition has consistently found
that decoders are adept at recognizing what emotions are
indicated by particular facial expressions (Ekman, 2003; Calvo
and Nummenmaa, 2015). But, when it comes to judging the
authenticity of such facial displays, accuracy rates are markedly
lower (Frank and Ekman, 1997; McLellan et al., 2010). When
judging deception, for example, they are often at chance levels
(Bond and DePaulo, 2006; Porter et al., 2012). This raises
questions regarding the role emotions play in communication
and social interactions. People regularly produce expressions
when they wish to communicate to another person how they
feel (Zuckerman et al., 1986). However, the advantage of
decoding such expressions hinges on the displays matching the
senders’ true underlying affect. For instance, liars in real-world
high-stakes scenarios have been shown to produce deliberate
expressions to aid their deception, which decoders are unable
to differentiate from genuine expressions (Porter et al., 2012).
This is compounded by the fundamental assumption decoders
make that the behavior of others is honest, unless prompted to
consider otherwise (DePaulo and DePaulo, 1989). If decoders
cannot distinguish deliberate displays from genuine affect these
may be used to the advantage of the sender (i.e., lying about one’s
feelings), leading to misleading or even detrimental inferences.
The case may be that senders are capable of producing deliberate
expressions that resemble genuine affect sufficiently to fool
decoders (Krumhuber and Manstead, 2009). Thus, it is important
to understand if human decoders can discriminate genuine and
deliberate expressions of emotions.
In the past, much of the emotion perception work attempting
to answer this question has focused on a binary distinction
between spontaneous (genuine) and posed (deliberate)
expressions. To this end, a variety of acted expressions have
been considered under the umbrella term of ‘posed’ displays,
thereby glossing over different production methods that may
lead to differences in expression and perception. Such voluntary
behavior has typically been thought to differ from spontaneous
expressions in the neural pathways of cortical and subcortical
activation (Rinn, 1984; Morecraft et al., 2001), resulting in
marked differences in visual appearance and timing (Cohn and
Schmidt, 2004; Namba et al., 2016).
Whilst existing research suggests deliberate displays offer an
advantage in emotion recognition tasks (Dawel et al., 2016), their
use has been criticized in recent years due to their intentional
nature to communicate the desired emotion (see Sauter and
Fischer, 2017). Given the prevalence of existing stimulus sets to
feature voluntary facial expressions (for a review see Krumhuber
et al., 2017), we think it is important to draw a difference between
various types of deliberate behavior. For example, the classical
‘posed expressions’ are voluntarily-produced emotional displays
resulting from specific instructions such as those employed in
directed facial action tasks (Russell, 1994). ‘Portrayed expressions’
are spontaneous deliberate expressions that occur in the absence
of explicit instructions, but are congruent with the context in
which they occur, such as smiling for a photograph (Vazire
et al., 2009). ‘Enacted expressions’ are expressions voluntarily
produced after reliving a congruent past experience of the
emotion, often done using method acting techniques (Scherer
and Bänziger, 2010). Furthermore, the way in which researchers
produce emotional displays for their stimuli vary widely, from
using photographic stimuli that senders must imitate (e.g., Field
and Walden, 1982), to the direct manipulation of facial muscle
activation (e.g., Ekman et al., 1983), or simply using verbal
prompts (e.g., Lewis et al., 1987). Thus, a further goal of our
research is to shed light on the effect that these different practices
may have on how human emotion perception is studied.
Accounting for this large variability in production methods,
it seems reasonable to explore the impact of these different
types of deliberate displays on expression perception. For this,
we focused on the perception of a single emotion: surprise.
Surprise is considered a basic emotion, having a distinctive facial
configuration that is well recognized cross-culturally (Nelson and
Russell, 2013; Namba et al., 2016). It is consistently found to
have high recognition rates, second only to happiness (Ekman,
2003). Also, surprise is argued to be a neutral-valence emotion,
and one determined by context (Ekman, 2004). In order to elicit
surprise spontaneously, we considered the surprise expression
to be more closely related to the startle response, i.e., a sudden
defensive response to an external aversive stimulus. We therefore
used a jack-in-the-box, an approach that in the past has been
successful in eliciting a startle response, primarily in infants (e.g.,
Reissland et al., 2002), due in part to the unpredictable timing
and the abrupt appearance of the jack. In addition to genuine
expressions of surprise, two types of deliberate expressions were
produced either on the basis of a recent emotional experience, or
via improvisation based on no/minimal information.
Besides considering expression type, we investigated
whether the modality of presentation (static vs. dynamic)
can significantly impact authenticity discrimination. While
static facial expressions of adequate intensity are sufficient to
allow accurate emotion classification, dynamic aspects have been
shown to enhance ratings of naturalness (Sato and Yoshikawa,
2004) and intensity (Biele and Grabowska, 2006), leading to
stronger facial mimicry (Sato et al., 2008) and brain activation
patterns in decoders (Trautmann et al., 2009). Dynamic
information also enables better discrimination between genuine
and deliberate displays (Krumhuber and Manstead, 2009;
Maringer et al., 2011). This may be due to the fact that these are
more complex and richer in expressive signal, thereby helping
with the processing of emotional information (see Krumhuber
et al., 2013). The use of dynamic stimuli may consequently better
reflect the true authenticity of an expression.
In the present research, we contrasted genuine expressions
of surprise with deliberate expressions produced after seeing an
affect-evoking stimulus, i.e., the jack-in-the-box (Rehearsed) or
without seeing it (Improvised). Re-enacting a genuine emotional
experience is thought to facilitate the production of an authentic-
looking deceptive display, as the sender is using the recent
affective information of how an emotion feels and makes
them behave (Bänziger and Scherer, 2007). This in turn may
produce an expression that closely mirrors spontaneous surprise.
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Alternatively, improvising an expression by using one’s lay beliefs
may produce a successful deceptive display (cf. Reisenzein et al.,
2006), as the aim is to convey a specific message, which in turn
may match the expectations of the decoder (i.e., exaggerated
expressions are better recognized; Hess et al., 1997).
We hypothesized differences between the three types of
surprise expressions in terms of their perceived genuineness,
intensity, and judgmental confidence. Specifically, decoders
should be able to accurately and confidently detect genuine
surprise (Genuine), but should show poorer performance and
less confidence when judging deliberate expressions (Rehearsed
and Improvised). Whilst rehearsed surprise might lead to higher
ratings of genuineness in comparison to improvised surprise, it is
the improvised expressions that are predicted to be perceived as
higher in intensity.
These differences in expression perception should be further
moderated by the presentation format (static vs. dynamic). Using
dynamic stimuli compared to static images stimuli increases
ecological validity, allows for subtler elements of an emotion (e.g.,
onset, timing, duration, and fluidity) to be incorporated into the
decoding process, and can improve authenticity discrimination
(e.g., Hess and Kleck, 1994; Ambadar et al., 2005; Krumhuber and
Kappas, 2005). We therefore predicted that dynamic information
enables a better discrimination between genuine and deliberate
expressions than what could be achieved with static displays.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 120 participants were recruited online through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk1) in exchange for $0.75;
MTurk was used due to the benefits offered by online
recruitment, and the comparable responses to laboratory samples
(see, Casler et al., 2013). After deleting incomplete cases (N = 31)
the final data encompassed 89 participants (51 men, 38 women),
with an age range of 20–54 years (M = 29.9, SD = 8.9). Informed
consent was obtained online prior to their participation. The
two-factor experimental design included the presentation format
(static vs. dynamic) as between-subjects variable, and expression
type (genuine, rehearsed, and improvised) as within-subjects
variable. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two
conditions, resulting in 46 people in the static group and 43
people in the dynamic group. A power analysis using G∗Power
3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) for an interaction between presentation
format (2) and expression type (3), assuming a medium-sized
effect (Cohen’s f = 0.18), determined that this sample size
would be sufficient for 95% power. All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. Ethical approval for the present
study was granted by the UCL Department of Psychology Ethics
Committee.
Stimulus Material
For the production of the stimulus expressions of surprise, 39
university students (12 males, 27 females; Mage = 24.54, SD = 5.31;
1www.mturk.com
age range = 19–45 years) were video-recorded under one of the
three elicitation conditions:
In the Genuine condition, encoders were seated in front of the
jack-in-the-box and turned the wheel until the toy “popped out”;
a melody played as the wheel was turned prompting the action
from the toy. The exact function of the toy was not described
prior to the start of the experiment nor was the emotion under
investigation explicitly mentioned. A camera was placed at eye-
level, and recoded their reaction from the start of the winding
action until the end of their behavioral response; the jack was not
visible in the videos.
In the Improvised condition, encoders turned the wheel,
carrying out the same hand action as those in the genuine videos.
However, the electronic mechanism that releases the toy was
made non-operational. Instead participants watched a video on
a tablet positioned in front of the box. The video showed a
countdown and played the same melody as the jack-in-the-box.
When the word “NOW” appeared on the screen, participants had
to act in a surprised manner. The countdown was matched for
time and volume with the jack-in-the-box.
In the Rehearsed condition, encoders first had the experience
of seeing the real jack-in-the-box as those in the genuine
condition. The jack’s wheel was then disconnected from the
releasing mechanism, and the tablet with the countdown video
was placed in front of it, as done in the Improvised condition.
This time, encoders were asked to reproduce their previous
emotional reaction when the word “NOW” appeared on the
tablet’s screen.
A Panasonic SDR-T50 camcorder was used to record the facial
reactions at 25 frames per second. For each condition, there
were thirteen exemplars: Genuine (4 men, 9 women), Rehearsed
(5 men, 8 women), and Improvised (3 men, 10 women). These
produced both static and dynamic portrayals of each expression,
netting 39 static and 39 dynamic stimuli. Dynamic stimuli were
silent video clips and lasted approximately 10 s. Static stimuli
consisted of a single frame of the peak expression taken from
each video; defined as the frame before the expression began to
relax (see Figure 1). All stimuli were displayed in color (size:
1920 pixels× 1080 pixels).
Procedure
The study was conducted using the Qualtrics software
(Provo, UT). As mood can affect classification accuracy
(Forgas and East, 2008), it was necessary to control for this
factor, by asking participants the following question: “How do
you feel at this moment?” using a 5-point Likert-type scale
FIGURE 1 | Stimuli used in the study illustrating the three types of surprise
expressions: (a) Genuine, (b) Rehearsed, and (c) Improvised.
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(1 – extremely sad, 5 – extremely happy). After obtaining age and
gender information, they were instructed to watch each stimulus
carefully and rate the facial expression of the sender. It was made
clear that some senders were genuinely reacting to a jack-in-the-
box, while others never saw the toy puppet popping out and were
merely attempting to appear surprised. Participants saw either
static or dynamic displays of all 39 stimuli (presentation duration
was 10 s in both conditions), in randomized order, and rated the
expressions on several dimensions.
The extent to which they perceived the expression as a
genuine response to seeing the jack-in-the-box was measured
using a single item, 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from −2
(‘certain no Jack-in-the-box’),−1 (‘no Jack-in-the-box’), midpoint
of 0 (‘not sure’), to +1 (‘with Jack-in-the-box’) and +2 (‘certain
with Jack-in-the-box’), with higher scores indicating greater
perceived genuineness. The responses were aggregated across the
13 exemplars of an expression type, yielding a total score ranging
from −26 to +26 on perceived genuineness (see Dawel et al.,
2016).
Overall accuracy of participants’ ratings of the expressions
were also calculated. A judgment was accurate if participants
responded that they thought there was a jack-in-the-box present
(with any level of certainty) and indeed the sender was reacting
to a jack-in-the-box, or if they responded that there was no jack-
in-the-box and, in fact, the sender was only pretending to be
surprised. To formulate the measure of accuracy in authenticity
discrimination, these responses were compared to the actual
conditions of the stimulus, ignoring trials in which the participant
responded ‘not sure’ (see Levine et al., 1999). If there was a
match (e.g., rehearsed and improvised expressions were seen
as having no jack-in-the-box, and genuine expressions were
judged to have a jack-in-the-box), they were coded as accurate
(score = 1). If there was a mismatch, it was coded as inaccurate
(score = 0), yielding a final total score ranging from 0 to 13 for
each expression type. For ease of comprehension, we re-labeled
the totals using a percentage scale from 0% (lowest accuracy) to
100% (highest accuracy).
This was followed by participants’ confidence ratings of their
decision (1 – not at all, 5 – very much) to assess potential
discrepancies between accuracy and perceived ability (Vrij and
Mann, 2001). Finally, participants were asked to judge the
intensity of the sender’s expression using a 5-point Likert-type
scale (1 – not at all, 5 – very much).
RESULTS
Preliminary analyses indicated no significant differences between
male and female participants in their judgment ratings, Fs< 1.95,
ps > 0.15. Thus, we collapsed across gender for all subsequent
analyses. Adding mood as a covariate did not affect any of
the results reported below, ps > 0.30. In both conditions,
judgment ratings were averaged across the 13 exemplars within
each expression type. A 2 (Format: dynamic vs. static) × 3
(Expression: genuine, improvised, rehearsed) mixed-factorial
ANOVA was conducted on each of the four dependent measures.
The Greenhouse–Geisser adjustment to the degrees of freedom
was applied when Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of
sphericity had been violated.
Genuineness
There was a significant main effect of Expression,
F(1.81,157.72) = 39.78, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.314, but not Format,
F(1,87) = 1.20, p = 0.277, on perceived genuineness. In
addition, the interaction between the two factors was significant,
F(1.81,157.72) = 30.40, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.259 (see Figure 2). To
decompose the interaction, the simple main effect of expression
was analyzed on each format condition.
The results revealed a significant simple main effect of
Expression in the dynamic condition, F(2,86) = 49.45, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.535. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction
showed that genuine expressions (M = 6.86; SD = 5.49) were
rated as significantly more genuine than improvised expressions
(M = −3.40; SD = 7.60), t(42) = 9.68, p < 0.001, 95% CI [8.12,
12.39], d = 1.48, and rehearsed expressions (M = 0.09; SD = 7.40),
t(42) = 6.69, p < 0.001, 95% CI [4.73, 8.81], d = 1.02. Improvised
expressions were judged to be the least genuine and significantly
differed from rehearsed expressions t(42) =−5.23, p< 0.001, 95%
CI [2.14, 4.84], d = 0.80.
The analysis also revealed a significant main effect of
Expression in the static condition, F(2,86) = 7.76, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.153. Pairwise comparisons revealed that genuine
expressions (M = 3.83; SD = 8.78) were rated significantly more
genuine than rehearsed expressions (M = 1.02; SD = 8.61),
t(45) = 3.02, p = 0.004, 95% CI [0.93, 4.67], d = 0.45, but no
different from improvised expressions (M = 3.63; SD = 8.80),
t < 1, p = 0.839. Improvised expressions were also judged as
significantly more genuine-looking that rehearsed expressions,
t(45) = 3.14, p = 0.003, 95% CI [4.28, 0.94], d = 0.47.
When considering differences in genuineness ratings between
formats, simple effects analyses showed that improvised
FIGURE 2 | Mean ratings for perceived genuineness of facial expressions
(error bars ±1 SE). Positive values indicate that expressions were perceived
as more genuine, while negative values indicate that they were perceived as
more fake. The asterisks represent a significant difference at ∗p < 0.005 and
∗∗p < 0.001.
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expressions were judged as significantly less genuine-looking
when they were presented in dynamic than static format,
F(1,87) = 16.14, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.156. This difference did
not occur in the context of genuine, F(1,87) = 3.76, p = 0.056,
η2p = 0.041 or rehearsed expressions, F < 1, p > 0.59.
Accuracy
The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Expression,
F(1.23,106.94) = 22.08, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.202, and Format,
F(1,87) = 10.70, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.109. Overall, accuracies in
authenticity discrimination were higher in the dynamic than
static condition (Mdiff = 8.34, SDdiff = 2.55). Also, genuine
expressions (M = 57.92, SD = 20.85) were rated more accurately
than both rehearsed (M = 37.92, SD = 21.69), t(88) = 5.23,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [1.16, 3.11], d = 0.55, and improvised
expressions (M = 41.46, SD = 22.46), t(88) = 4.37, p < 0.001,
95% CI [1.64, 3.11], d = 0.46. The difference in accuracy between
rehearsed and improvised expressions was not significant,
t(88) = 2.23, p = 0.028, 95% CI [0.05, 0.87], d = 0.24. The
interaction term was not significant, F(1.23,106.94) = 1.72,
p = 0.193 (Figure 3). When comparing the accuracy scores to
chance performance (33.3%), genuine expressions were classified
significantly above chance level, t(88) = 11.14, p < 0.001,
95% CI [2.63, 3.77], d = 1.18, as were improvised expressions,
t(88) = 3.42, p = 0.001, 95% CI [0.44, 1.68], d = 0.36. However,
rehearsed expressions were no different from chance (Bonferroni
corrected), t(88) = 2.01, p = 0.048, 95% CI [0.01, 1.19].
Intensity
There was a main effect of Expression, F(2,174) = 15.72,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.153, but no effect of Format, F(1,87) = 1.22,
p = 272, on perceived intensity. The interaction between the two
factors was significant, F(2,174) = 19.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.187
(Figure 4).
FIGURE 3 | Mean accuracies in authenticity discrimination in the dynamic and
static format split by expression type (error bars ±1 SE). The lines above the
bars represents a main effect of Format. The brackets above the bars
represent a significant difference between Expression type. The asterisks
represent a significant difference at p < 0.001. The dotted line represents
chance performance (33.3%).
When decomposing the interaction, simple effects analyses
revealed a significant main effect of Expression in the dynamic
condition, F(2,86) = 25.38 p < 0.001, η2p = 0.371. Pairwise
comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed that genuine
expressions (M = 43.00, SD = 5.07) were rated as more intense
than rehearsed (M = 37.81, SD = 6.27), t(42) = 6.63, p < 0.001,
95% CI [3.61, 6.77], d = 0.70, and improvised expressions
(M = 38.05, SD = 7.34), t(42) = 5.57, p < 0.001, 95% CI [3.16,
6.75], d = 0.59. Both types of deliberate expressions did not,
however, significantly differ from each other, t < 1, p > 0.99.
Additionally, a significant simple main effect of Expression in
the static condition, F(2,86) = 8.59, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.166, showed
that genuine expressions (M = 41.02, SD = 9.24) were rated as
less intense than improvised expressions (M = 43.09, SD = 8.39),
t(45) =−2.84, p = 0.007, 95% CI [−3.53,−0.60], d = 0.30, but not
rehearsed expressions, t(45) = 1.35, p = 0.183, 95% CI [−0.53,
2.65]. Improvised expressions were perceived as more intense
than rehearsed expressions, t(45) = 3.21, p = 0.002, 95% CI [1.17,
5.10], d = 0.34.
When considering differences in intensity ratings between
formats, simple effects analyses showed that improvised
expressions were judged as significantly more intense when they
were presented in dynamic than static format, F(1,87) = 9.05,
p = 0.003, η2p = 0.094. This difference did not occur in the context
of genuine, F(1,87) = 1.54, p = 0.218, η2p = 0.017, or rehearsed
expressions, F(1,87) = 1.39, p = 0.241, η2p = 0.016.
Confidence
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Expression,
F(2,174) = 6.14, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.066, and a marginal significant
effect of Format, F(1,87) = 3.66, p = 0.059, η2p = 0.040, on
confidence ratings. These effects were qualified by a significant
interaction between the two factors, F(2,174) = 8.78, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.092 (Figure 5).
When decomposing the interaction, the simple main effect
of Expressions was significant in the dynamic condition,
FIGURE 4 | Mean ratings for perceived intensity of facial expressions (error
bars ±1 SE). The asterisks represent a significant difference at ∗p < 0.01 and
∗∗p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 5 | Confidence scores in the dynamic and static format split by
expression type (error bars ±1 SE). The asterisks represent a significant
difference at ∗p < 0.01 and ∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
F(2,86) = 14.29, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.249. Pairwise comparisons
with Bonferroni correction showed that participants were less
confident in their ratings of rehearsed (M = 46.67, SD = 6.74)
and improvised expressions (M = 47.53, SD = 6.83), compared
to genuine expressions (M = 50.00, SD = 7.48), t(42) = 4.13,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [1.70, 4.95], d = 0.44, t(42) = 3.76, p = 0.001,
95% CI [1.14, 3.79], d = 0.40. The two deliberate expressions did
not significantly differ from each other, t(42) = 1.11, p = 0.27, 95%
CI [−0.70, 2.42].
The simple main effect of Expression was not significant in the
static condition, F < 1, p > 0.75.
When considering differences in confidence ratings between
formats, simple effects analyses showed that genuine expressions
were more confidently judged in the dynamic than static
condition, F(1,87) = 8.59, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.090. Neither ratings of
improvised, F(1,87) = 2.11, p = 0.150, η2p = 0.024, nor rehearsed
expressions, F(1,87) = 1.15, p = 0.287, η2p = 0.013, were affected
by presentation format.
DISCUSSION
Emotions are a central aspect of social interactions, however, not
all expressions of emotion are genuine. Knowing the authenticity
of an expression can be a crucial factor in determining our
perception of and interaction with others (Johnston et al.,
2010). Here, we investigated decoders’ ability to discriminate
genuine expressions of surprise from deliberate expressions
produced after a recent experience with actual surprise or in
its absence, presented both in dynamic and static format. Our
results support our predictions, finding significant effects due
to both presentation format and expression type. We extend
past emotion perception research by considering how different
methods of producing an expression can affect perception and
authenticity discrimination.
Genuine expressions, when presented dynamically, were
perceived both genuine-looking and intense, echoing past
findings (Sato and Yoshikawa, 2004; Krumhuber et al., 2013).
These were also the most accurately discriminated as having
occurred in the presence of an affective event (i.e., seeing the
jack-in-the-box) and the most confidently judged by decoders,
compared to the two deliberate expression types. In static
presentation, genuine expressions were still the most accurately
discriminated, but markedly lower than when presented
dynamically. Conversely to the alternative presentation, in
static format, these were rated as more genuine than rehearsed
expressions, but equal to improvised expressions on genuineness.
Decoders’ judgmental confidence did not differ between
expression types, and was significantly lower than in dynamic
presentation.
For the deliberate conditions, in line with our predictions,
rehearsed expressions presented dynamically were rated
as appearing more genuine than improvised expressions,
but still lower than genuine expressions. They were also
perceived as less intense than genuine expression, but equal
to improvised expressions. Decoders were poor at detecting
rehearsed expressions as being deliberate, showing the lowest
overall accuracy. Confidence was equal to that of improvised
expressions, but still lower than genuine. When presented
statically, however, rehearsed expressions were rated lower
than improvised expressions in terms of genuineness, but
equally on intensity and judgment confidence to genuine
expression. Lastly, improvised expressions, in dynamic format,
were rated the least genuine-looking of all expressions (rated
negatively), but rated equally intense and confidently to
rehearsed expressions. These expressions were also poorly
discriminated as being deliberate. When presented statically,
their intensity ratings were significantly higher than those of all
other expressions, confirming our predictions; they also were
perceived equally genuine-looking and judged as confidently as
genuine expressions.
These findings have important methodological implications
for the emotion field. To understand human emotion perception,
we argue, considerations must be given to (1) the ability
to separate genuine from deliberate expressions of emotions,
and (2) differences in how the emotion stimuli are produced,
as it is clear that these can significantly impact decoder
perception. Presentation format was also an important factor
in emotion perception (Hess and Kleck, 1994; Ambadar
et al., 2005). Expressions presented dynamically were more
accurately discriminated, were judged more confidently, and
differences in their perceived intensity and genuineness were
more pronounced; static presentation limited such perceptual
differences between expressions.
Past inconsistencies reported for decoders’ ability to
discriminate expression authenticity (e.g., McLellan et al.,
2010; Porter et al., 2012), we suggest, may be resolved by
considering the type of expressions used and the presentation
format. Here, decoders displayed some perceptual ability in
recognizing genuine surprise (static and dynamic), but accuracy
was not perfect. While for the deliberate expressions, their
ability to discriminate these as not being genuine was poor, in
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both formats, and varied by expression type (marginally); these
performances were even poorer when presenting the expressions
as static faces. Decoders, also, showed no self-awareness
relating to their accuracy; while they perceived differences in
expression intensity, genuineness, and even judgment confidence
(predominantly in dynamic presentation), these did not aid
authenticity discrimination. Given these performances, it would
suggest that decoders do not possess a finely tuned perceptual
mechanism to discriminate facial expression authenticity, as they
do for emotion categorization.
In the current study, decoders evaluated the expression in
the absence of external or contextual information. Eliciting
the expressions in a controlled environment permitted a
clear comparison between different expression types. However,
decoders are unlikely to see such isolated expressions in everyday
scenarios with the sole task of detecting authenticity (Reisenzein
et al., 2006). This may partly explain why using emotional cues
as markers for deception does not produce improvements in
accuracy (Porter et al., 2012). Relying on such “cues” will not be
beneficial unless decoders can discriminate if these are genuine or
deceptive (see Zloteanu, 2015). An interpretation of the current
findings is that senders are capable of producing expressions
that look sufficiently genuine to fool decoders (Krumhuber and
Manstead, 2009; Gunnery et al., 2013). Emotional expressions,
thus, can be a strategic tool in communication, used to instill a
specific affective belief in the decoder, which benefits the sender.
It is not difficult to extend this logic to other deceptive scenarios,
such as high-stakes criminal lies, where producing a deceptive
expression might help escape suspicion (e.g., Porter et al., 2012).
Our findings cast doubt that in a real-world setting where
people are not instructed to classify the authenticity of emotional
displays, and where emotions tend to more ambiguous, observers
could accurately distinguish genuine from deceptive emotional
signals. Alternatively, context can, in certain scenarios, aid
authenticity judgments (Blair et al., 2010). Removing context
from the judgment task may in turn have affected decoders, as the
information which may hint that an expression is genuine/fake
was absent.
The current consideration for expression type can also
aid our understanding of emotion recognition. Intensity is
considered an important component in the perception and
accurate classification of emotions (Hess et al., 1997). It has
been argued that deliberate expressions may appear either less
intense in presentation, as they are absent of the underlying
affect (Levenson, 2014), or more intense, as they are attempts
by the sender to communicate information successfully (Calder
et al., 2000). Given the current results, this may be resolved
by considering how the expressions are produced. Namely,
rehearsed expression were perceived as less intense than genuine
expressions (in dynamic format), while improvised expressions
were perceived as more intense (in static format). For this reason,
differences on emotion perception tasks may occur based on the
authenticity of the stimuli (i.e., genuine or deliberate), the type
of production method used (e.g., rehearsed or improvised), the
presentation used (i.e., dynamic or static), or a combination of
these factors. For instance, using static improvised expressions
in a recognition task, due to their perceived high intensity,
may result in overinflated recognition rates for surprise.
Regarding authenticity discrimination, intensity did not show
any relationship with accuracy, in either dynamic or static
presentation. Thus, facial intensity seems not to be diagnostic of
authenticity, but more related to the method of production used
to elicit the expression.
Finally, dynamic presentation of facial displays offers clear
benefits to emotion research. Given the current data, it is
clear that using ecologically valid stimuli that reflect genuine
expressions allow for subtle differences between expression
types to be perceived by decoders, and offer a more realistic
approximation of human emotion perception (Trautmann et al.,
2009; Sauter and Fischer, 2017). Future research should expand
the current findings to explore how decoders perceive other
emotions, given the variation in perception and accuracy based
on valence and category (see Barrett, 1998), and extended to
more social emotions, such as shame and embarrassment (e.g.,
Tracy and Matsumoto, 2008), to better understand emotion
production and perception. Expansions may also consider
individual differences in expressive control (Berenbaum and
Rotter, 1992) and emotion regulation (Gross, 2002) as factors for
the successful production of deliberate expressions. Such work
may examine how expressive variability relates to perceptual
accuracy, by considering an inter-item analysis of the current
stimuli or by directly measuring expressive behavior in the task
(e.g., using automated facial expression analysis; Valstar et al.,
2006). Also, different emotions could have different effects in
terms of senders’ ability to display genuine-looking expressions
and decoders’ ability to discriminate authenticity. For instance,
the current approach did not consider the role of the gender of the
sender, which some research suggests may affect perception (e.g.,
Krumhuber et al., 2006); future research should test for gender
differences in production and perception.
CONCLUSION
The ability to accurately discriminate and perceive differences
in expressions of surprise was affected by both the type of
deliberate expressions seen and the way they were presented.
Even when asked to specifically judge authenticity, decoders were
not adept at separating genuine from deliberate expressions of
surprise. While they showed some ability to accurately detect
genuine surprise, they also tended to misclassify deliberate
expressions as genuine, regardless of expression type. The way
in which the deliberate expressions were produced also affected
how they were perceived. Rehearsed expressions, in a dynamic
format, were perceived as more genuine in appearance than
their improvised counterparts and were slightly more difficult to
detect as non-genuine. In comparison, improvised expressions
were rated as more intense and genuine in appearance in
a static format. This supports our predictions of perceptual
differences between genuine and deliberate expressions occurring
as a result of the method used to produce and present the
stimuli. For measuring differences in human emotion perception
and accurate authenticity discrimination a dynamic presentation
was found to be superior, allowing for nuanced perceptions
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of intensity, genuineness, and judgment confidence between
expressions. Together, the findings illustrate the complexity
of human emotion production and perception, the need for
ecologically valid stimuli, and the importance of considering
expression type in emotion research.
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